In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents' intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon by endogenizing agent trustworthiness as a response to potential returns. It …nds that agents acquire lower trustworthiness when monitoring becomes relatively cheaper over time, which may actually drive up the overall governance cost in society. Across societies, those giving employees lower weights in choosing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust.
extrinsic incentives. 3 The costs of monitoring, screening, and cultivating trustworthy agents, however, are not only a¤ected by exogenous technical features, but, more importantly, also by the incentive structure that shapes the relevant resource allocation decisions on cost reduction. In fact, this paper shows that principals and agents have con ‡icting interests in such matters: agents are better o¤ with higher trustworthiness and higher monitoring costs; in contrast, principals always prefer cheaper monitoring methods and do not necessarily bene…t from hiring more trustworthy agents. A natural implication is that principals have strong incentives to reduce monitoring costs, but much less to reduce the costs of screening and cultivating agent trustworthiness, while the opposite is true for the agents.
Since principals have quite di¤erent incentives from agents in the choice of governance modes, which side has more weight in resource allocation becomes very important in shaping the relative cost of trust and monitoring and hence their actual usage. This yields the following cross-sectional variation: societies giving lower weights to the welfare of workers when choosing governance modes rely more on extrinsic governance and less on trust. It is indeed supported by empirical evidence: the collective labor power is negatively correlated with the supervision intensity among developed economies; speci…cally, the US, UK, and Canada have the lowest labor powers and the highest supervision intensities, while the opposite is true in Japan, Germany and Denmark (Esping-Anderson 1990, Gordon 1994, Rubery and Grimshaw 2003, Botero et al. 2004) . A discrete version of this result is that an individualistic society tends to rely more on monitoring than a group-oriented one, if agents in individualistic societies enjoy lower weights in resource-allocating decisions; this is consistent with the distinct management styles in the US versus Japan, 4 and in the two medieval trader groups mentioned above. 5 3 The experiences of American …rms seem to be consistent with this result. The intensively monitored workplace and the "con ‡ict-ridden state of labor-management relations in many American industries" are held partly to blame for "the low productivity and poor quality of American work" (Mills 1994 ). Faced with intense competitive pressure from foreign …rms, various high performance work practices relying more on cooperation e¤orts from employees started to be adopted from the 1980s (Appelbaum and Batt 1994, Cappelli 1995, Cappelli and Neumark 2001) . But such a transforming process is slow and di¢ cult to sustain due to "insu¢ cient trust" (Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 1994). The consequences of low trust have motivated lively discussions among public and social scientists. See, among others, Putnam (1995) , Cook (2001) , James (2002) , and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) . 4 In a survey cited by then Secretary of Labor Ann McLaughlin in 1988, "only 9 percent of American workers felt they would bene…t from their companies' increased productivity compared to 93 percent of Japanese workers interviewed in a similar survey" (Mills 1994 ). Not coincidentally, public education in Japan "does not shy away from teaching children proper 'moral' behavior, and moral education continues in the worker training programs sponsored by Japanese corporations." (Fukuyama 1995 , p. 188-89) 5 The "social structure of the Maghribi traders' group was 'horizontal,' as traders functioned as agents
The con ‡ict of interest between principals and agents with regard to agent trustworthiness may seem puzzling at …rst sight. If hiring trustworthy agents reduces governance costs, then principals should necessarily bene…t from it; this is also the general impression one gets from discussions on social trust. But there are two problems in such an argument: it ignores the competition among principals and the endogeneity of agent trustworthiness. As a standard result of competition, the rent from hiring more trustworthy agents disappears in equilibrium; the logic is similar in spirit to Becker's (1962) insight on …rms'reluctance to invest in the general training of employees, anticipating that competitive …rms will steal them away with higher wages. 6 Principals gain only when the bottom agents are more trustworthy, but then these agents have no incentives to make a costly investment in trustworthiness only to bring free windfall to principals. In other words, any rent captured by a principal is at risk of being bid away by ex post labor market competition and by ex ante investment of agents. The existence of labor market frictions may enable principals to capture some rent; such a rent, however, is not only limited in value, since it is bounded above by the degree of frictions, but also temporary in possession because it is rooted in the shifting sand of endogenous agent trustworthiness. In sharp contrast, the reduction of governance cost due to cheaper monitoring methods is immune to both hazards.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is to provide a novel explanation for how the levels of intrinsic trustworthiness and monitoring intensities di¤er across societies and evolve over time. Speci…cally, it delivers three main implications that can be tested empirically.
(1) Across societies, those giving workers lower weights in resource allocation choices tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trustworthiness levels. (2) As the monitoring cost is likely to fall relatively faster than screening and cultivating costs, monitoring intensities tend to increase over time while the average trustworthiness tends to decline, the more so in societies where workers have less power in making decisions.
Cheaper monitoring technologies may induce excessive monitoring that crowds out trustworthiness and drives up the governance cost.
In this paper, trustworthiness is essentially a trait or skill, endogenously invested by parents in one's childhood, that enables one to resist short-run opportunistic temptations. 7 and merchants at the same time," while agency relations were organized "vertically" among the Italian traders in that "merchants and agents constitute two distinct subgroups" (Greif 1993 ). The Maghribi traders maintained close social ties to reduce the costs of training and screening trustworthy agents, while the Genoese traders adopted new technologies and institutions to reduce monitoring costs. 6 In contrast, …rms may be willing to invest in corporate culture (Rob and Zemsky 2002, Kreps 1997 ) and employee identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2005) , in the same way as they are willing to invest in …rm-speci…c human capital. 7 A more systematic treatment of trust-related concepts based on personality traits is in Huang (2007) .
For other bases of trust such as social norms or altruism in the context of a principal-agent model, see
Though it often brings desirable results in terms of higher welfare, such results are typically not the goal in mind when trustworthy behaviors are exhibited. This interpretation of trustworthiness is consistent with its daily life usage as re ‡ected in the dictionary de…nitions of trust, which focus on the trusted person's essential integrity and character, rather than on whether he or she has external incentives to refrain from taking advantage of others.
Furthermore, the extensive experimental evidence produced over the past four decades on human behavior in social dilemmas "demonstrates that internalized trust is a common phenomenon; that it is at least in part learned rather than innate; and that di¤erent individuals vary in their inclinations toward trust." (Stout and Blair 2001) This paper is thus related to studies of endogenous social preferences and ethical behav- worthiness in Section 3. The …nal section presents conclusions.
The Basic Model

A Principal-Agent Model with Monitoring
A principal hires an agent to complete a project. The outcome is stochastic: if the agent makes the appropriate e¤ort, the outcome is h > 0 with probability p 2 [0; 1] and 0 with probability 1 p; if the agent shirks, the probability of getting h is q 2 [0; 1), where q < p, and that of getting 0 is 1 q. The cost of making e¤ort is e, while shirking involves no cost.
hp e > hq is assumed to be true so that making e¤ort e is the social optimal choice.
There is a continuum of measure one of agents, who are heterogeneous in predisposition to cooperate. An agent has a degree of trustworthiness 0 that measures the amount of guilt he feels if he shirks, whether caught or not by the principal. 8 The cumulative distribution function of trustworthiness among agents is F ( ) on < + . It characterizes the quality of workforce in this economy. Agents are risk neutral, and there is a liability constraint such that a negative payment is not feasible for agents. 9 Principals are identical and of measure one. The reservation utility of agents and the alternative return for principals are normalized to zero. To reduce shirking, a principal may screen job candidates and monitor the agent on the job. In this basic model an agent's trustworthiness is publicly observed. A more general case is studied in the next section, where a principal can obtain a noisy signal of through a screening process.
The monitoring intensity is denoted by m 2 [0; 1], which equals the probability that an agent who shirks gets caught by the principal. The total monitoring cost is mk, where k measures the unit cost of using monitoring technologies such as video cameras in the workplace. Monitoring is usually imperfect because e¤ort is di¢ cult to measure; for example, video cameras can record whether an agent is working, but they do not always enable the principal to tell whether the agent is making a conscientious e¤ort or just daydreaming while working.
The payment to an agent has two components: one is the basic wage b 0 that is independent of the agent's performance, and the other is the incentive payment w 0, 8 Presumably, indicates an agent's cooperative tendency, which may lead to di¤erent levels of trustworthiness in di¤erent situations (Huang 2007) . In this paper is directly called an agent's trustworthiness because the game is …xed so that there is a one-to-one relationship between the two. Modeling as an intrinsic bene…t of cooperation does not a¤ect the results. 9 Risk averse agents were assumed in an earlier version of the paper, which yields similar results.
which will be forsaken if shirking is detected by the principal. 10 The utility of an agent with is thus w + b e when he makes e¤ort, and (1 m)w + b if he shirks.
The time line of the game with publicly observed agent trustworthiness is as follows.
Principals announce their incentive packages (m; w; b) as functions of the agent's perceived trustworthiness . Agents then match with principals. After the matching is …nished, agents get the basic wage b and choose whether to make the e¤ort or shirk. Principals then monitor agents with intensity m, pay w if no shirking is found, and pay nothing if otherwise. 11 
The Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is reached in this game when there is no further changing of partners and, once in a match, nobody wants to deviate from their decisions. For positive levels of monitoring to happen and to simplify analysis, the following condition is assumed:
We solve the game backwards.
Lemma 1 In any given match, the optimal incentive package (m ; w ; b ) includes w = e,
for e, and m = 0 for > e. Given this incentive scheme, all agents make the e¤ ort;
the optimal pro…t of a principal is Q = hp e k(e )=e if e, and hp e if > e. The governance cost for e is
which decreases in and increases in k, and zero for > e.
Proof. Given the incentive package (w; m; b), an agent does not shirk if w + b e
(1 m)w + b . This is simpli…ed to the following no-shirking condition
cost of e¤ort (2) where an agent won't shirk if the sum of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives is larger than the cost of e¤ort.
For agents with e, (2) implies that the minimum monitoring level required to deter shirking is (e )=w. So if a positive monitoring level is ever chosen, the principal's objective function is
subject to the participation constraint w + b e 0. Note that b = 0 must hold, since if not, the pro…t can always be increased by reducing b and increasing w to reduce the monitoring intensity (e )=w. The Lagrangian is thus
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
w e 0; 0; (w e) = 0:
should hold, which cannot be true given that k < e holds under assumption (1). If > 0, then w = e, which leads to m = (e )=e. Given this incentive scheme, all agents make the e¤ort, and the principal's optimal pro…t is
For agents with > e; their intrinsic incentive alone is high enough to prevent shirking, so the principal would set m = 0 and b + w = e, where b = 0 and w = e are assumed to be consistent with the case of e. The pro…t is thus hp e, which is the highest possible social surplus that can be achieved by a principal-agent couple in this economy. The gap between hp e and pro…t Q indicates the level of governance cost, which is M ( ; k) hp e Q = k(e )=e for e and 0 for > e; it coincides with the total monitoring cost m k.
Since an agent with a higher requires a lower governance expenditure M ( ; k) and thus brings a higher pro…t Q , all principals prefer to hire him; but then competition among principals would bid up a rent r( ; k) for the agent so that a principal's pro…t would become Q r( ; k). In contrast, an agent with the lowest trustworthiness in the economy, 0, gets a zero rent because there is no competitive bidding for him. So his principal earns a pro…t Q = hp e k(e )=e;
which increases in and decreases in k.
Given that principals are identical with a mass equal to that of agents, all of them would end up earning the same pro…t in equilibrium. This implies that a principal hiring an agent with > must pay a rent r ( ; k) to her agent such that
The total compensation for an agent is thus equal to
which increases in and k but decreases in . The income of the bottom agents with is e, independent of their own trustworthiness . When = 0, principals'pro…t becomes
which does not depend on agent trustworthiness at all. In contrast, when > 0, principals bene…t from agent trustworthiness by capturing a partial rent Q Q 0 = =e > 0.
Once all principals earn an identical pro…t Q , nobody wants to change agents anymore. 12 Similarly, agents do not gain from changing principals either. The agent income I ( ; k; 0) = e+k =e, principals'pro…t Q 0 , and the governance cost M ( ; k) are illustrated in Figure 1 . The relevant results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the competitive equilibrium of the basic model, each principal pays a rent r ( ; k; ) in (3) to her agent with trustworthiness in addition to the incentive pay w = e, so an agent's total income is I ( ; k; ) in (4). All principals make an identical pro…t Q , which is decreasing in k, increasing in , but independent of .
The underlying intuition of this proposition is as follows. Given an agent's trustworthiness, principals adjust their monitoring intensities and incentive pays accordingly to save governance costs. Because of perfect competition between principals, the cost saved is transferred to agents as a rent, leaving principals with a pro…t that they would have made 1 2 The pro…t of a principal is actually maxfQ ; hqg, where hq arises when the principal pays the reservation wage to the agent and does not monitor him. So monitoring is chosen if and only if Q hq; since Q Q 0 , this condition is true when Q 0 hq, which holds by assumption (1). not bene…t from hiring agents with higher trustworthiness in equilibrium, though they do gain when the bottom agents are more trustworthy, since Q increases in . In this sense, the bottom-level trustworthiness serves as a public good for all principals.
Inter-Generational Dynamics: Endogenous Trustworthiness
The distribution of in society is endogenized in this part. Suppose principals and agents live for one period, each raising a child to replace their role. The underlying technologies remain the same over generations, and all agent children are endowed with an identical productive ability to that of their parents. Their intrinsic trustworthiness is zero at birth, which can be improved by parental investment during childhood to maximize a child's lifetime income minus the investment cost.
The sequence of events is as follows. In the beginning of generation n = 1; :::; 1, the distribution of n is realized. Then the above stage game is played, where the competitive equilibrium derived in Proposition 1 prevails. At the same time, the agent n inculcates trustworthiness n+1 in his child, expecting him to get an equilibrium income I ( n+1 ; k; n+1 ) when the child becomes an adult, where n+1 denotes the lowest trustworthiness in generation n + 1. The inculcation cost C( n+1 ; n ) is increasing and convex in n+1 , while it decreases in parental trustworthiness n ; that is, C 1 > 0, C 11 > 0; C 2 < 0,
And it costs nothing to retain the initial zero trustworthiness so that C(0; ) = 0.
Then generation n + 1 replaces the old one, and the sequence of events goes on. The objective function of a parent in generation n is maxfR( n ); eg where
Note that R( n ) = e when n+1 = 0, that is, agent parents can always get a net return of e by not investing in their children's trustworthiness.
Given that the income of the bottom agents, e, is independent of their trustworthiness n+1 while investing in any positive trustworthiness is costly, n+1 = 0 must be true. This implies that the lowest trustworthiness of agents in generation n would never be positive. 13 As a result, principals would always earn a pro…t Q 0 that is independent of n+1 , and thus cannot capture any rent generated by agent trustworthiness from the second generation onwards. Similarly, no agent would have n+1 > e, since doing so yields the same income as having n+1 = e but incurs larger investment costs. Thus we have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In any generation n 2, the lowest trustworthiness is always 0 and the highest is not larger than e; as a result, the pro…t of all principals is Q 0 in (5).
This proposition suggests that, if principals capture a partial rent Q Q 0 in the above static model due to > 0, then it has to be transferred back to agents in this dynamic model of endogenous trustworthiness. That is, principals do not bene…t from agent trustworthiness once it is costly to cultivate.
The optimal solution to problem (6) with n+1 = 0 and its comparative statics are stated in the following proposition and illustrated in Figure 2 .
Proposition 3 (i) There exists a unique optimal solution n+1 g( n ; k) to problem (6), where g( n ; k) strictly increases in n and k.
(ii) There exists at least one stable steady state ss = g( ss ; k) when k is not too small. (iii) In all the stable steady states, ss strictly increases in k, and, contrary to the short-run result in Lemma 1, the governance cost M ( ss ; k) decreases in k when the elasticity of ss over k is high enough.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This proposition suggests that, when trustworthiness is endogenously determined, cheaper monitoring technologies may increase the governance cost, which is in stark contrast to the short-run view in Lemma 1. The intuition is as follows. If monitoring is cheaper in the next generation, the lifetime return of trustworthiness is lower, so agents will invest less in it; but when the levels of trustworthiness are lower, principals have to monitor agents more intensively. When the e¤ect of a higher monitoring intensity outweighs that of a lower unit monitoring cost, the total governance cost goes up; this happens when the elasticity of trustworthiness over k is large enough. 14 A speci…c case is provided by the following example.
Example. Suppose the cost function is
where 0 < a < 1 and b > 0. 15 Then the objective function is
The unique optimal child trustworthiness is
which is strictly increasing in k and n , and strictly concave in n . In any generation n + 1, the governance cost is
which strictly decreases in k when n+1 is endogenously determined. 1 4 The mechanism is in some sense similar to the familiar phenomenon that, when the demand is elastic, a lower price may lead to a much higher demand and thus a higher total expenditure. 1 5 When a 1, the marginal bene…t of investing in trustworthiness is ever-increasing before e is reached so that n+1 = e for all agents.
3 Costly Screening
A Principal-Agent Model with Monitoring and Screening
An extension to the basic model is studied in this section. An agent's trustworthiness is not publicly observed. A principal may pay a screening cost S > 0 to observe a signal z = +", where " is a random variable with cdf V ( ) and support ( E; E). Screening enables principals to reduce governance cost by hiring more trustworthy agents and using more suitable incentive packages. Screening, however, is costly so that it may not be worthwhile to hire agents with low signals. Let z l denote the threshold signal, below which an agent is not hired by a screening principal. Since the maximum reduction of the governance cost is k, a necessary condition for a positive mass of screened agents is S < k, which is assumed.
The time line of this screening game is similar to that in the basic model. Principals …rst decide whether to screen or not. Those who choose to screen announce their selection criterion z l and the incentive package (m s ; w s ; b s ) as functions of z, hire the …rst agent with z z l and reject others. Principals who do not screen would hire whoever comes …rst and adopt a single incentive package (m r ; w r ; b r ), since all agents look the same to them. Agents then decide where to apply for jobs; in fact, all agents would go to screening principals …rst, since searching involves zero cost for agents. If an agent is screened but turned down by a principal, it is publicly observed, though the signal z is not; then this agent can only work for a non-screening principal, since a screening principal is better o¤ by screening a fresh agent than him. As a result, no agents are ever screened more than once. After matching is …nished, agents get the basic wage and rent, if any, and then choose whether to make the e¤ort or shirk. Principals monitor agents, pay the incentive wages if shirking is not detected, and pay nothing if detected. The competitive equilibrium is reached when all principals stick to their screening choices, there is no partner-changing, and, once in a match, nobody wants to deviate from their decisions.
Again we solve the game backwards. Given the incentive package (m s ; w s ; b s ) o¤ered by a screening principal, the probability that the agent with a signal z will make the e¤ort once hired is Pr( e m s w s ) = Pr(" z e + m s w s ) = V (z e + m s w s );
as implied by the non-shirking condition (2). So with probability V (z e + m s w s ) the agent makes the e¤ort and produces an expected output hp, while with probability 1 V (z e + m s w s ) he shirks and produces a lower expected output hq. He is caught with probability m s and loses the incentive wage w s . A screening principal's expected pro…t from hiring an agent with signal z is thus
Note that the screening cost S can be interpreted as the expected cost of a successful hire, and hence does not depend on the actual number of job candidates screened.
A non-screening principal does not incur any screening cost and thus observes no signals of an agent's trustworthiness; she knows, however, that an agent not hired by a screening principal must have a signal z < z l . Let ( ) denote the cdf of the distribution of z, which is determined by the distributions of and ". Then given the incentive package (m r ; w r ; b r )
o¤ered by a non-screening principal, the probability that an agent shirks is Pr( < e m r w r jz < z l ) = F (e m r w r ) (z l ) ;
as implied by (2) . A non-screening principal's expected pro…t from hiring an agent is thus
When the labor market clears, the proportion of agents working for non-screening principals must be equal to that rejected by screening ones, which is (z l ); this is also the proportion of principals who choose not to screen. Competition among screening principals equalizes their pro…ts, which, in equilibrium, would also be the same as the optimal pro…t 
where r s (z; k; S; Q r ) = Q s Q r is the rent received by an agent with z z l . I s ( ; k; S; Q r )
is increasing in k and , decreasing in S and Q r , and concave in . Note that the screening cost increases the pro…t of principals but reduces agent incomes in comparison to the basic model. The expected income of an agent is lower not only because it is the agent that ultimately pays the screening cost S, but also because principals earn a higher pro…t Q r than before. The intuition is that the positive screening cost is a form of market friction that reduces competition among principals and hence enables them to capture some rent generated by agents. Again, as in the basic model, principals do not gain from hiring an agent with higher trustworthiness.
Endogenous Trustworthiness with Screening
The endogenization of with costly screening is similar to that in the basic model, except that in each generation the stage game with costly screening is played, and the competitive equilibrium derived in Proposition 4 prevails.
The objective function of a parent in generation n = 1; 2; :::; +1 is R s ( n ; Q r;n+1 ) max n+1 I s ( n+1 ; k; S; Q r;n+1 ) C( n+1 ; n ); taking as given Q r;n+1 , the equilibrium pro…t of principals in generation n + 1. Since R s ( n ; Q 0 ) strictly increases in n , there must exist a unique trustworthiness level such
To simplify analysis, we consider only the case with n+1 ( ) and E 0:5 . 16 Proposition 5 For any generation n 2, the following beliefs and strategies constitute a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: (i) Every non-screening principal believes that their agent has zero trustworthiness regardless of his signal and o¤ ers an incentive package (m ; w ; b )j =0 as in Lemma 1, while each screening principal believes that = z "
for any z E and = 0 if otherwise, hires the …rst agent with z E, and o¤ ers (m s ; w s ; b s ) as in Proposition 4.
(ii) All principals get the same pro…t Q 0 as in the basic model; agents with n+1 = 0 work for non-screening principals and get an income e, while those with n+1 > 0 work for screening principals and get an expected income
Agents who are descendants of families with n < would have n+1 = 0, while those with n would choose n+1 > 0 to get
Proof. Given the belief of non-screening principals that their agents have zero trustworthiness, the optimal incentive package is (m ; w ; b )j =0 as proved in Lemma 1. Then their pro…t is Q 0 in (5) and the income of their agents is e. Due to competition, screening principals also make Q 0 , and the extra gain Q r Q 0 captured in the static model with screening is transferred back to agents. So principals do not bene…t from agent trustworthiness once it becomes endogenous, the same as in the basic model.
An agent with n+1 = 0 can only work for a non-screening principal because his highest possible signal E is smaller than the threshold E because E 0:5 by assumption.
Thus e is the net return of no investment in a child. Since R s ( n ; Q 0 ) strictly increases in n and R s ( ; Q 0 ) = e holds by de…nition, families with n < would have n+1 = 0 for any generation n 1, while only those with n would ever invest in their children. Then agents with n+1 > 0 are always hired by screening principals and gets an expected income I s ( n+1 ; k; S; Q 0 ), since their lowest signals, n+1 ( ) E, are higher than the threshold E given that n+1 ( ) . Thus all agents working for non-screening principals have zero trustworthiness, which is consistent with the belief stated in (i).
The optimal trustworthiness of descendants in families with 1 and the relevant comparative statics are stated in the following proposition, which is similar to Proposition 3 in the basic model. See Figure 3 for illustration.
Proposition 6 (i) There exists a unique optimal solution n+1 g s ( n ; k) to problem (11), where g s ( n ; k) strictly increases in n and k.
(ii) When k is not too low, there exists at least one stable steady state with s ss = g s ( s ss ; k) > 0 for all agents from families with 1 and 0 for others; that is, a proportion 1 F ( ) of agents have s ss , where increases in k but decreases in S. (iii) In all the stable steady states, s ss strictly increases in k, and, contrary to the short-run result in Proposition 4, the governance cost M s (z ss ; k) = hp e Q s (z ss ; k) decreases in k when the elasticity of s ss over k is high enough.
The intuition is similar to that presented previously, except for the new insight that cheaper monitoring not only reduces the amount of investment in each child's trustworthiness, but also induces fewer agents to invest in it, the more so when the screening cost is higher.
A social planner, when deciding on how to allocate resources in reducing monitoring, screening, and inculcation costs, would take into consideration the dynamic crowding-out and crowding-in e¤ects of monitoring technologies on agent trustworthiness. Individual principals, however, do not necessarily internalize the negative externalities they impose on agent incomes when allocating resources to reduce monitoring costs. In other words, principals tend to over-invest in monitoring technologies. The reason is that the long-run pro…t of principals, Q 0 , increases when monitoring is cheaper, but it does not change when inculcation or screening costs are lower; in contrast, the incomes of agents decrease in the former case, but increase in the latter. So principals gain but agents lose when the unit cost of monitoring is lower; agents bene…t from lower inculcation and screening costs, whereas principals are indi¤erent. This con ‡ict of interests between principals and agents seems fundamental in determining the basic incentive structure of a society's resource allocation choices between reducing monitoring costs versus reducing inculcation and screening costs, and hence may shape the long-term trends and cross-sectional variations of trust and monitoring intensity.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between trust and monitoring in reducing moral hazard problems in a principal-agent setting. Agent trustworthiness and monitoring intensities are both determined by fundamental forces in society such as the costs of monitoring and screening agents and the cost of inculcating trustworthiness; their long-term trends and cross-sectional variation are thus shaped by how these relevant costs change.
While acknowledging the in ‡uence of exogenous technical features on the cost-reduction process, we argue that an important role is also played by the inherent con ‡ict of interests between principals and agents in equilibrium: principals bene…t from lower monitoring costs, but not necessarily from lower screening and inculcation costs, whereas the opposite is true for agents. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper, agent trustworthiness declines and monitoring intensities increase over time; they may do so at faster rates in societies where the interests of agents are given a lower weight in the choice of monitoring schemes. The overall governance costs, however, may be driven up by cheaper monitoring technologies, which crowd out intrinsic incentives and induce society to rely too much on extrinsic ones. These results are indeed consistent with preliminary empirical evidence, though more rigorous tests are needed in future research.
The main insights of this paper also apply to situations with general market frictions that give principals certain monopsony powers. The following results can be readily obtained with similar arguments as in the text. Principals may capture a rent from agent trustworthiness when labor market frictions exist; the rent, however, is limited by the degree of frictions and, more importantly, it again disappears once trustworthiness becomes endogenous. Since labor market frictions increase principals' pro…ts but reduce agent incomes, principals have less incentive to eliminate them, while the opposite is again true for agents.
This paper can be extended in various directions to get a more thorough understanding of the relevant issues. For example, the resource allocation decisions on improving various governance modes can be explicitly modeled in a bargaining or political economy environment. The screening process can be ‡eshed out and repeated interactions between principals and agents may be added to better address potential problems associated with screening in a diverse and mobile society. The identical production ability of agents assumed in this paper can also be relaxed to study the trade-o¤ or complementarity between investment in cognitive and non-cognitive skills from the perspective of aggregate welfare. For instance, if the di¢ culty in monitoring increases when higher cognitive abilities are involved, then the thoroughness of screening and the combination of governance modes should vary across jobs in some systematic way.
It yields the unique optimal choice n+1 g( n ; k) in each generation n since the second order condition C 11 < 0 always holds. n+1 increases in n and k because
Note that the left-hand side of (12) is strictly increasing in k; this implies that all parents except those with the lowest level of n will invest in a positive n+1 when k=e C 1 (0; 0) 0 holds. Furthermore, parents with n > e will invest in n+1 e, and g( n ; k) is continuous and increasing in n . These three conditions suggest that there must exist at least one stable steady state ss 2 (0; e) such that g( ss ; k) = ss holds. And ss is unique if g( n ; k) is concave; this happens if
Note that @ ss =@k > 0 because a higher k shifts up the transition function g( n ; k) due to
The governance cost at the steady state, M ( ss ; k) = k(e ss )=e, may actually increase when k is lower, since ; is high enough. In fact, as long as n+1 is endogenous, the governance cost M ( n+1 ; k) may be higher when monitoring is cheaper.
Similar arguments suggest that, when there are multiple steady states, the trustworthiness levels and the corresponding governance costs in the stable states will exhibit the same properties with respect to k.
Proof of Proposition 4. Similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 1 suggest that
After re-arranging terms, the pro…t function (7) becomes
Maximizing Q s subject to the participation constraint w s e 0 leads to the …rst order conditions:
w s e 0; s 0; s (w s e) = 0:
After rearranging the …rst two conditions, we get s 1 + km s =w s = 0. If s = 0, we have w s = km s , but then it is contradictory to w s > e, since km s k and k < e by assumption (1). If s > 0, we have w s = e, and m s is uniquely determined by V 0 (z e + m s e)(h(p q) m s e) + 1 V (z e + m s e) k=e = 0;
since the second order condition SOC V 00 (h(p q) m s e)e 2V 0 e < 0 holds given V 00 ( ) 0 and V 0 ( ) > 0. Based on (13) we get
By the envelope theorem we get
The analysis of pro…t function (8) is similar. After re-arranging terms, we get
Maximizing Q r subject to the participation constraint w r e 0 leads to the …rst order
w r e 0; r 0; r (w r e) = 0: Similar analysis as above leads to w r = e, and m r is uniquely determined by
So the average governance costs M s (z; k) hp e Q s and M r (z l ; k) hp e Q r both increase in k, the same as in the basic model, and decrease in z and z l , respectively.
In general, screening and hiring a more trustworthy agent brings a higher potential pro…t to justify the screening cost S > 0, while there is no bene…t in screening a nontrustworthy agent. In the extreme case when is perfectly observed by screening principals, Q s (e) > Q r (e) and Q s (0) < Q r (0) must be true; when the signal z is not too noisy to nullify the advantage of screening a more trustworthy agent, Q s (z l ) > Q r (z l ) should still hold for high levels of z l , while the opposite should hold true when z l is low. And as both Q s ( ) and Q r ( ) are strictly increasing functions, there must exist a unique z l such that
Based on (15) where @Q s =@z l @Q r =@z l > 0 holds because the non-screening principal, who has less information than the screening principals about her agent's trustworthiness, is less e¢ cient in generating pro…ts.
As in the basic model, competition between screening and non-screening principals implies that a rent r s (z; k; S; Q r ) = Q s (z) Q r (z l ) has to be passed to an agent who has a signal z > z l and works for a screening principal.
So all principals earn an identical pro…t equal to Q r (z l ), which decreases in k and increases in S because Q 0 r (z l )@z l =@k + @Q r =@k < 0 and Q 0 r (z l )@z l =@S > 0. An agent with gets an expected income I s ( ; k; S; Q r ) = e + Z E z l r s ( + "; k; S)dV ("); it is strictly increasing in k and concave in because Note, however, I s ( ; k; S; Q r ) is lower when the screening cost S is higher, since Q s (z) decreases in S. In general, principals make a higher pro…t when screening is available than in the basic model, that is, Q r Q always holds, since non-screening principals can always get Q by treating their agents as all having the lowest trustworthiness level .
Proof of Proposition 6. The objective function is max n+1;i I s ( n+1 ; k; S; Q 0 ) C( n+1 ; n ):
The …rst order condition for an interior solution is @I s ( n+1 ; k; S; Q 0 )=@ n+1 C 1 ( n+1 ; n ) = 0:
It yields the unique optimal choice n+1 g s ( n ; k) in each generation n because the second order condition SOC s < 0 always holds due to concavity of I s ( n+1 ; k; S; Q 0 ) and C 11 > 0.
n+1 is increasing in both n and k because @ n+1 @ n = C 12 ( n+1 ; n ) SOC s > 0;
where @ 2 I s ( n+1 ; k; S; Q 0 )=@ n+1 @k > 0 is true given that @ 2 r s (z n+1 ; k; S; Q 0 )=@k@z n+1 = @m s =@z n+1 > 0. So the left-hand side of (16) holds when the indirect e¤ect is big enough. In fact, as long as n+1 is endogenous, the governance cost M s ( n+1 + "; k) may be higher when monitoring is cheaper. Similar arguments suggest that, when there are multiple steady states, the trustworthiness levels and the corresponding governance costs in the stable states will exhibit the same properties with respect to k.
Based on = 1 F ( ) and (10) we get
So the proportion of agents with a positive trustworthiness decreases in screening cost S and increases in monitoring cost k.
